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SELLER'S RIGHT OF RECLAMATION UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Thomas J. Romans*
A seller's right to reclaim goods sold on credit to an insolvent
buyer who subsequently enters bankruptcy has enjoyed long-standing
recognition.' This common law remedy is continued in section 2-702
of the Uniform Commercial Code." Louisiana grants a lien to sellers
in the form of a vendor's privilege.' The seller reclaiming under
U.C.C. section 2-702, however, sometimes was defeated in bankrupt-
cy proceedings for a variety of reasons, such as the reclamation right
being determined to be a statutory or state-created lien or prefer-
ence in conflict with the federal bankruptcy statute.' The federal
courts became divided on the recognition of this right in bankruptcy
proceedings for divergent reasons.' The Bankruptcy Reform Act,
which became effective October 1, 1979,' sought to grant recognition
*B.B.A., Notre Dame; L.L.B., University of Virginia; L.L.M., New York Univer-
'sity. Member, New York and New Jersey bars.
1. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876). See Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods
by Unsecured Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 357, 359-60 (1975);
Ashe, Reclamation Under UCC-An Exercise in Futility, Defrauded Seller v. Trustee
in Bankruptcy, 43 REF. J. 78, 79-80 (1969).
2. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1972 version). See note 18, infra, -and accompanying text.
3. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3227 provides in part:
He who has sold to another any moveable property, which is not paid for, has a
preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the purchaser,
whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the property still remains in
the possession of the purchaser.
This statutory preference accorded sellers of movables does not extend to sellers who
make sales outside Louisiana. In re Hoover, 447 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1971). As of the date
this article was written, Louisiana had not adopted Article 2 (Sales) of the U.C.C. but
had adopted Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8. See generally Mashaw, A Sketch of the Conse-
quences for Louisiana Law of the Adoption of "Article 2: Sales" of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 42 TUL. L. REV. 740 (1968).
4. See generally Sebert, The Seller's Right to Reclaim: Another Conflict
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act?, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 219, 220-21 (1976); Weintraub & Edelman, Seller's Right to Reclaim Property
Under Section 2-702 (2) of the Code Under the Bankruptcy Act: Fact or Fancy, 32 Bus.
LAW. 1165, 1170-72 (1977).
5. See generally 3A Bender's U.C.C. Service, R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, Sales &
Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 13.034[a] (1980 ed.).
6. The Act to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, Public
Law 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, was signed by President Carter on November 6, 1978, and
by its terms became effective October 1, 1979. Title I of Public Law 95-598 codifies and
enacts as Title 11 of the United States Code the law relating to "Bankruptcy." The
new Title 11 replaces the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which is repealed by section 401 of
Public Law 95-598, and is referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, or Code. There is an
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to this important creditor right and to remove the uncertainty faced
by sellers seeking reclamation.! This article will discuss how effec-
tively the new bankruptcy law, referred to as the Bankruptcy Code,
or Code, has eliminated this uncertainty connected with reclamation
prior to the Code.'
TRADITIONAL RECLAMATION RIGHTS
As a general rule the seller has the right to reclaim goods sold
to an insolvent buyer, regardless of whether the buyer becomes in-
volved in bankruptcy proceedings." In a typical case, the seller ships
merchandise or supplies to a buyer who, unknown to the seller, is in
financial straits and trying to keep his business operations alive by
requesting extended credit terms from key suppliers. At early com-
mon law the seller, once aware of the buyer's inability to pay and
having parted with both possession and title to the goods, was
unable to stop the goods in transit or to reclaim them from the
buyer. 10 Exceptions to this rule quickly emerged with respect to
goods of a unique character or exclusive privileges, such as patents
and copyrights.11 The courts eventually reasoned that when the
buyer had misrepresented his ability to pay, the buyer's title was
subject to divestment by reason of the buyer's fraud, and the seller
should be permitted to rescind the sale and reclaim the goods.12
Reclamation at common law Was an exclusive remedy. The
reclaiming seller was required to return any payment received and
was unable to recover damages." Reclamation also was recognized
when bankruptcy proceedings commenced after the seller had ship-
approximate five-year transition period before the new United States bankruptcy
court system becomes effective on April 1, 1984.
7. See 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 546.0411] (15th ed. 1980).
8. This article assumes that the reader has little or no familiarity with the
subject of bankruptcy. The fundamental principles involved are summarized to
facilitate an understanding of the context in which reclamation arises and of the com-
peting interests involved.
9. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the historical development of
the right of reclamation. Other writers already have done so. See 12 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1458 (3d ed. 1970); Hawkland, Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and
Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the
Kravitz Case, 67 COM. L.J. 86 (1962). For cases permitting reclamation in bankruptcy,
see Comment, Bankruptcy-Reclamation and the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 Mo. L.
REV. 262, 266-69 (1968).
10. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 9, at § 1458.
11. Id.
12. See Ashe, supra note 1, at 79-81.
13. See, e.g., Walker v. L. Maxcy, Inc., 103 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 564 (1939).
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ped the goods." If the goods had. been sold or used by the debtor or
the trustee and reclamation was granted, the seller was entitled to the
proceeds of the sale.'" The need for reclamation was highlighted
when large retail or retail chain establishments, suddenly and with-
out warning, were immersed in bankruptcy proceedings.'6
Prior to the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code, the proof
necessary to establish the right to reclaim was often onerous.
Sellers at times were required to: (1) identify their goods in the
hands of the debtor or trustee in bankruptcy, (2) establish fraud
with clear and convincing proof, (3) prove that the buyer was insol-
vent when the sale was consummated and did not intend to pay, (4)
show that these facts were concealed knowingly by the buyer from
the seller, and (5) prove that these misrepresentations of the buyer
were material. 7 The seller's evidentiary task was simplified with the
appearance of the U.C.C.
SECTION 2-702 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The U.C.C. in one major respect simplifies the task of the
reclaiming seller by creating an irrefutable presumption of fraud.'"
U.C.C. section 2-702'" extends the protection afforded the seller of
14. See note 1, supra. See also Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 40 REF. J. 37 (1966). Reclamation proceedings in bankruptcy prior to
the Bankruptcy Code did not have a definite statutory basis. These proceedings
developed from attacks on the trustee's lack of title to property otherwise vested
under section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, See Comment, supra note 9.
15. Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U.S. 385 (1908).
16. See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 4, at 1175.
17. See O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1961); Kennedy,
The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems
Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 549-56 (1960).
18. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1972 version); Comment, supra note 9. See King, Reclamation
Petition Granted In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REF. J. 81, 82 (1970). But see
Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REv. 435, 455
(1971).
19. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1962 version):
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does
not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to
reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency
or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other
remedies with respect to them.
(Emphasis added). The foregoing constitutes the 1962 version. The 1972 version
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goods on credit by the common law. When the seller discovers that the
buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent, the seller may
reclaim upon demand, verbal or written, within ten days after the
buyer's receipt of the goods. The seller's right to reclaim under sec-
tion 2-702 is intended to replace the common law right of reclama-
tion, but this right can be cut off by those who purchase the goods
from the buyer in good faith or in the ordinary course of business.
The U.C.C., however, limits the seller's right in other respects.
Unless the seller gives notice within ten days of the buyer's receipt
of the goods, the seller may reclaim only if there has been a written
misrepresentation of solvency within the three months prior to the
buyer's receipt of the goods. The right of reclamation, if exercised,
is the seller's exclusive remedy concerning the goods at issue.
Accordingly, the seller should not be permitted to claim a deficiency
and share in the distribution of assets to the general creditors of the
bankrupt." Subsection (1) of section 2-702 recognizes the seller's
right to stop delivery or refuse delivery except for cash under sec-
tion 2-705 of the U.C.C. when the seller discovers the buyer to be
insolvent.2'
RECLAMATION UNDER THE U.C.C. IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Although sellers usually had fared well in reclamation actions
under pre-U.C.C. law, sellers seeking reclamation under U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-702 encountered numerous challenges by trustees in bankrupt-
cy or by debtors in possession. 2
deleted the phrase "or lien creditor" as a measure to avoid one area of conflict with
the Bankruptcy Act.
20. See Sebert, supra note 4, at 220. But see R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note
5, at § 13.03[2] 13-13. A proof of claim is a request to share in the bankrupt's general
assets (an unsecured claim) or in a specific asset of the bankrupt (a secured claim),
while reclamation is a demand that the seller's property be returned to the seller. Fil-
ing of a claim, therefore, may be treated as a final election of remedies and a waiver of
reclamation. See In re Myley Elec. Supply Co., Inc., 291 F 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
21. Subsection 1 of section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
"Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except
for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and
stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705)." See generally Levy, Effect of the
Uniform Commercial Code Upon Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 60 CoM. L.J. 9
(1955); Note, A Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 DICK. L. REV. 158 (1954).
22. See Note, UCC 2-702(2 and the Bankruptcy Act: To Lien or not to Lien, 50
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 725, 726 (1976) (for a compilation of cases illustrating the conflict
between the Bankruptcy Act and section 2-702 of the UCC). Although it has been said
that reclamation is not viewed with favor in bankruptcy, the remedy traditionally was
allowed because it was considered unjust to grant the bankrupt estate title to
property belonging to another. Id. at 744. To the extent that fraud is no longer a re-
quirement, the consideration that reclamation may disrupt the careful balance between
1162 [Vol. 41
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A key purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to ensure a uniform
and equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among the cred-
itors. The trustee stands in the shoes of the bankrupt in that he
takes title to the bankrupt's property subject to existing rights and
security interests of third parties existing as of the commencement
of bankruptcy." The trustee distributes the proceeds of these assets
to creditors, who are secured or unsecured. The debtor in possession
has this role if no trustee is appointed. The secured creditor has a
security interest in, or a lien against, specific property and is enti-
tled to payment from the proceeds of the sale of that property. Com-
plete equality of distribution is not always feasible. Accordingly,
bankruptcy law establishes an order of priority for the payment of
certain types of unsecured claims prior to pro rata distribution of
the unencumbered assets among the remaining unsecured creditors.
Generally speaking, the order of priority is: (1) administration
expenses, (2) certain wage claims and contributions to employee
benefit plans, (3) consumer creditor claims, and (4) certain tax
claims.2
Early concern existed in Congress that state-created priorities
would destroy the federal priorities specified by the bankruptcy pro-
visions. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 recognized the validity of state
priorities. The 1938 Congress amended the Act to recognize only
state-created priorities in favor of landlords, thus nullifying cred-
itors' attempts to gain the advantage of other state-created priori-
ties. However, resourceful creditors turned to state-created
statutory liens to preserve this advantage."
Actions taken by the debtor or aggressive creditors in the
immediate pre-bankruptcy period could undermine fundamental
policies of the Bankruptcy Code by favoring one or more creditors
over other creditors in the distribution of the estate, notwithstand-
ing that the rights of parties generally are fixed as of the filing of
the petition, which commences the bankruptcy. Likewise, the imposi-
tion of state-created liens favoring certain creditors could interfere
with these policies. The Code (like prior law under the Bankruptcy
the seller and other creditors of the estate takes on greater importance. Accordingly,
equity may be sacrificed to achieve uniformity, administrative simplicity, and ease of
application. Id. at 744.
23. W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 541.01-.08 (3d ed. 1980).
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (1978). See TROST. TREISTER, FORMAN, KLEE & LEVIN,
RESOURCE MATERIALS-THE NEW FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE, ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1979); H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO THE BANKRUPTCY .REFORM ACT (1979), for a discussion of the workings of the new
Bankruptcy Code.
25. But see TROST, TREISTER, FORMAN, KLEE & LEVIN, supra note 24, at 141-42.
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Act) grants to the trustee and debtor in possession the power to
avoid certain transactions or transfers, such as judicial liens, prefer-
ences, and fraudulent transfers, occurring within defined periods
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. More-
over, the trustee has the power to avoid executory contracts that
may be onerous to the estate of the bankrupt. In order that the
trustee be capable of avoiding such transfers, he is given the status
as successor to both hypothetical creditors (the "strong arm") and
real creditors.'
Like section 70(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act, section 544(a)
(1) and (2) of the Code grants to the trustee the rights of a hypothe-
tical lien creditor with a judicial lien on all of the assets of the deb-
tor as of the date of the commencement of the case. This provision
is known as the "strong arm clause" and enables the trustee to set
aside unperfected security interests and other transfers that would
be invalid against a creditor who levied under state law on the date
of the bankruptcy.' A debtor in possession has these same powers
pursuant to section 1107 of the Code. The Code clarifies the strong
arm clause by providing that the trustee's rights are not dependent
on the existence of an actual creditor who could have obtained these
rights.
Section 70(e) of the old Bankruptcy Act enabled the trustee to
avoid transfers which an actual creditor with a provable claim could
have avoided under state law. Such transfers were set aside for the
benefit of all creditors even though they might have been invalid
only as to one actual creditor with a provable claim. This concept
was carried forward into section 544(b) of the Code, which dispenses
with the concept of a provable claim and overrules the cases enti-
tling the trustee to rely on the rights of an actual secured or lien
creditor. Now, a trustee may avoid a transfer under section 544(b)
by resorting to an allowable, unsecured claim.
Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act provided in general terms that
a statutory lien was invalid if it first arose on the debtor's insol-
vency, or if it was not good as against a bona fide purchaser. The Code
26. Id. at 135-49. The Code made substantial changes to the trustee's avoiding
powers; for a more detailed discussion of these see Levin, An Introduction to the
Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANK. L.J. 173 (1979). The "date of the
bankruptcy" generally refers to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings
brought on by the filing of a petition, either voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily
by one or more creditors. See W. COLLIER, supra note 23, at 11301-303.
27. With respect to a transfer of real property, section 544(a)(3) of the Code con-
fers on the trustee the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser from the debtor at
the commencement of the case. See W. COLLIER, supra note 23, at 1544.06; Levin,
supra note 26, at 174.
1164 [Vol. 41
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is similar in effect. 8 Moreover, the Code continues the policies of
avoiding fraudulent transfers (section 548) and preferential transfers
made within ninety days of filing the petition (section 547(b)).
The trustee's powers of avoidance are not without limitation.
Section 546 of the Code permits the post-petition perfection of a
statutory lien to have retroactive effect. Accordingly, section
9-301(2) of the U.C.C. permits perfection of a purchase money se-
curity interest to relate back to defeat an intervening lien creditor,
so long as the purchase money interest is perfected within ten days
after the debtor obtains the collateral." If perfection of a lien must be
done by seizure, section 546(b) of the Code permits this to be ac-
complished by notice.
Prior to the Code, reclamation actions under section 2-702 of the
U.C.C. were challenged successfully and found to be invalid as a
priority lien under section 70(c), a statutory lien under section
67(c)(1)(A), or a state-created priority or voidable preference under
sections 65(a) and 60 of the Bankruptcy Act."0 The federal courts
were widely divided as to the applicability of these provisions under
the Bankruptcy Act.' One response by at least eighteen state legis-
latures to preserve reclamation under section 2-702 was to delete the
phrase "or lien creditor" from section 2-702(3) and thereby avoid the
apparent conflict with section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 Never-
theless, the other grounds for challenge remained, perhaps the most
formidable of which was that section 2-702 constituted a statutory
lien under section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in the
case of In re Trahan that the Louisiana vendor's privilege is a
statutory lien."3 Numerous authors, however, urged that section
2-702 should be viewed as a codification of the common law cause
28. 11 U.S.C.A. § 545 (1978).
29. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(3) states clearly that actions taken to perfect a security
interest after the filing of the bankruptcy petition will not be stayed by the automatic
stay provision of section 362 of the Code. Section 362 essentially stays the pendency of
all actions and proceedings against the debtor and his estate.
30. See Ashe, supra note 1, at 79-80. See also R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra
note 5; Sebert, supra note 4, at 232-34.
31. See R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5; Braucher, Reclamation of Goods
From a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1281 (1967).
32. State Correlation Tables, U.C.C. REP. (1980 Supp.) See In re Daylin, Inc., 596
F.2d 853 (9th Cir., 1979); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Sec-
tion 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insol-
vent, 14 WES. RES. L. REV. 93 (1962).
33. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). The court found, interestingly, that because the
privilege was effective whether or not the buyer was insolvent, section 67 did not
apply.
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of action and should be granted the same position in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.'
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 546- THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Section 546(c) of the Code is "a legislative response to the
judicial confusion concerning the validity of § 2-702 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in a bankruptcy case.""
Section 546(c) of the Code provides that:
The rights and powers of the trustee under sections 544(a), 545,
547, and 549 of this title are subject to any statute right or
common-law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such
seller's business, of goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods if
the debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but-
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such
seller demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten
days after receipt of such goods by the debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right
of reclamation that has made such a demand only if court-
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as an administrative
expense; or
(B) secures such claim by a lien.
The comments by the House and Senate committees also highlight
the intent to clear up the confusion surounding reclamation in bank-
ruptcy situations:
The purpose of the provision [§ 546(c)] is to recognize, in part,
the validity of Section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which has generated much litigation, confusion, and divergent
decisions in different circuits. 6
Section 546(c) protects "any statutory right or common-law right
of a seller" to reclaim goods delivered to an insolvent debtor. This
protection is accomplished by subordinating the trustee's rights
under section 544(a) (trustee as lien creditor and as successor to cer-
tain creditors and purchasers), section 545 (avoidance of statutory
34. See, e.g., R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, at § 13.03[4][d][iv]; J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-15
(1972); Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41
(1975); Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The
Right to Recover the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 HARV. L. REV. 598 (1966); Comment,
Statutory Liens Under Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act: Some Problems of Defini-
tion, 43 TUL. L. REV. 305 (1969).
35. W. COLLIER, supra note 7, at 1546.04[1].
36. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-72 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1978).
1166 [Vol. 41
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liens), section 547 (preferences), and section 549 (post-petition trans-
actions).
The seller must take prompt action to protect his interests by
making a written demand for reclamation within ten days after or
prior to the time the debtor has received the goods. Contrary to
section 2-702 of the U.C.C., section 546(c) of the Code permits a
demand for reclamation prior to the buyer's receipt of the goods,
but does not extend the ten-day period if a written misrepresenta-
tion of solvency has been made. Also, no provision is made for oral
notice permitted under the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-702
by its terms excludes resort to common law reclamation, yet section
546(c) gives express recognition to such common law reclamation
rights.
The right of reclamation is limited. Section 546(c)(2) grants to
the court the discretion to deny the demand, but, in doing so, it
must protect the seller either by granting him an administrative ex-
pense priority claim or by securing the seller's claim with a lien.
This discretionary right to deny reclamation furnishes the courts
and trustees with the important ability to preserve goods that are
critical to the continued operation of the debtor's business. Consis-
tent with prior law under the U.C.C., the seller's rights in the goods
may be cut off by a good faith purchaser from the debtor. Also, the
reclaiming seller's rights are subject to any superior rights of other
creditors under any applicable non-bankruptcy laws. The legislative
history does not indicate which persons possess "superior rights."
According to a leading authority, this category would include at
least a buyer in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and a
good faith purchaser." The bankruptcy court will be able to deter-
mine these conflicting interests under its expanded jurisdiction,
which permits the bankruptcy court to adjudicate the entire con-
troversy .31
The language of section 546(c) has given rise to debate concern-
ing its interpretation."0 The statute reads in part: "The rights and
powers of the trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 of this
title are subject to any statutory right or common-law right of a
37. No time limit generally was imposed under the prior Bankruptcy Act for filing
a reclamation petition. See Nauman Co. v. Bradshaw, 193 F. 350 (8th Cir. 1912).
38. W. COLLIER, supra note 7, at 1546.04[2]n.12.
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b) (1978). The Code grants expanded jurisdiction so that
virtually every civil matter related to a bankruptcy case will be within the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court.
40. See Orr & Klee, Secured Creditors Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.C.C.L.J. 312, 342-45 (1979); Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding
Powers, 53 AM. BANK. L.J. 173, 197-98 (1979).
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seller . . . to reclaim . . .goods .... ." One view is that only if the
right of reclamation is subject to being avoided under one or more
of the enumerated avoiding powers, ie., sections 544(a), 545, 547, or
549, may the court deny reclamation; but the court then must give
the seller an administrative expense claim or a lien in lieu of
reclamation.'1 If the trustee is unable to avoid reclamation under
any of the enumerated powers, it may be argued that the savings
clause does not apply and the seller is not entitled to his goods, by
virtue of the automatic stay provisions of section 362 of the Code.
Another view is that reclamation applies regardless of whether or
not the right of reclamation could be avoided by the trustee under
any of the enumerated avoiding powers.'
If this latter view prevails, and reclamation has been properly
-demanded and is otherwise valid, the automatic stay provision of
section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code can be invoked by the trustee
to prevent reclamation of the goods; but the seller is entitled to the
protection of his interest, by way of either security or an adminis-
trative expense claim. If the former view prevails, reclamation will
be the exclusive remedy, and the court cannot substitute a lien or
an administrative claim for the goods. It is uncertain whether the
seller, upon being granted a lien, is entitled to adequate protection
under section 361 of the Code, and as a secured creditor, interest
under section 506(b).'3
Regardless of which view is adhered to, section 546(c) does not
offer blanket protection from the trustee's avoiding powers found
elsewhere in the Code and omitted from section 546(c), such as the
avoiding powers under section 544(b) (succession to actual unsecured
creditors), section 548 (fraudulent conveyances), section 553 (setoff),
section 510(c) (subordination), and section 551 (preservation of avoided
transfers). If a trustee uses these avoiding powers successfully, and
the claim is not otherwise secured or subject to setoff or disallow-
ance, it may be allowed under section 502 as a general unsecured
claim.
Two writers have pointed to at least three possible outcomes
under section 546(c): (1) If the right of reclamation is not avoidable
by the trustee under the Code, the right is valid but the seller's
reclamation petition is stayed automatically by section 362; (2) if the
right is avoidable only under the powers enumerated (ie., sections
41. See W. COLLIER, supra note 7, at 1546.0412].
42. Id. See 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 23, at 546.05.
43. See W. COLLIER, 8upra note 7, at 1546.0412]. As a general rule, if the trustee
will have the use of a secured creditor's collateral, the creditor under section 361 of
the Code is entitled to "adequate protection," a term not defined by the Code.
1168 [Vol. 41
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544(a), 545, 547, or 549), the seller's right must be granted subject to
the court's avoidance and provided the seller receives a lien or
administrative claim; or (3) if the right is avoidable under avoiding
powers other than those enumerated (e.g., fraudulent transfer), the
right is defeated and the seller is left with an unsecured claim."
This line of reasoning seems to give recognition to section 2-702
reclamation only in jurisdictions wherein reclamation rights were
unenforceable under the former Bankruptcy Act by reason of one or
more of the Act's counterpart provisions enumerated in section
546(c). Therefore, whenever reclamation was allowed under the
former Act, reclamation would not be acknowledged presently under
section 546(c) of the Code; the seller's reclamation action would be
stayed, and arguably, the seller whose action is stayed will share in
the distribution of the estate as a general unsecured creditor, or, if
the court grants the reclamation, the court will be powerless to
substitute an administrative claim or security for the seller's goods.
This type of analysis, however, appears wholly inconsistent with a
key purpose of section 546(c)-to remove the confusion theretofore
surrounding reclamation.
The seller will be limited further in reorganization cases by
reason of section 546(c)'s requirement that the debtor receive the
goods "while insolvent." The Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent"
as when the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets at a fair valuation.4 5
The definition of insolvency in the U.C.C. includes the bankruptcy
definition as well as the equity definition; i e., a person is insolvent
"who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of
business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law."" In many reor-
ganization cases the debtor will be solvent in the strict bankruptcy
sense, but insolvent in the equity sense. In such situations, the
seller will be denied reclamation if the courts adhere to the defini-
tion of insolvency in the Code.
With respect to the issue of insolvency, section 547 of the Code
dealing with preferences presumes that the debtor is insolvent dur-
ing the ninety days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition. This presumption is also the case with respect to setoff
under section 553 of the Code. The House Judiciary Committee
Report, commenting on the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation,
made some interesting observations concerning the subject of proof
of insolvency:
44. See Orr & Klee, supra note 40, at 343.
45. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(26) (1978).
46. U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1972 version).
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The preference section requires the bankruptcy trustee to prove
the debtor's insolvency at the time the preferential transfer was
made. Given the state of most debtor's books and records, such a
task is nearly impossible. Given the financial condition of nearly
all debtors in the three months before bankruptcy, the task is
also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent
during the three months before bankruptcy. Thus, the prefer-
ence section requires the trustee to prove a fact that nearly
always exists yet never can be proved with certainty.47
Also, section 303 of the Code provides that an involuntary case may
proceed if the debtor generally is not paying its debts as they
become due. Section 546(c) itself refers to state statutes, namely, the
U.C.C., yei uses "insolvency," one must assume, as defined by the
Bankruptcy Code. The Code, however, is replete with references to
insolvency in the equity sense.
It is unfortunate that these ambiguities were not removed in the
drafting of section 546(c). When the Code was in the process of being
drafted, the National Bankruptcy Conference proposed a section to
the House bill to deal with reclamation, a subject not addressed in
the early drafting. That section was intended to make section 2-702
of the U.C.C. inapplicable in bankruptcy cases and substituted a rule
of fraud derived from the common law."8 The Senate subcommittee
considering companion legislation incorporated a new version of sec-
tion 2-702(2) into the proposed bankruptcy act." The Senate's pro-
posal would have removed the obstacle of proving insolvency. It failed,
however, to deal with the rights of bona fide purchasers and supe-
rior liens. Section 546(c) is the outcome of these two proposals and is
essentially a resort to state law with certain limitations imposed. As
47. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178-79 (1977).
48. See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 4, at 1165-66.
49. This proposal read as follows:
Sec. 4-407. Right of Reclaiming Seller-A seller's right under state law to recover
property sold upon subsequent discovery that buyer received the property while
insolvent or at a time when buyer had ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or had an inability to pay his debts as they became due shall
not be defeated upon the commencement of a case under this Act by or against
the buyer as debtor because of anything contained in section 4-405 or 4-406 pro-
vided:
(1) debtor received the property on credit or payment by draft which was
subsequently dishonored; and
(2) within ten days of debtor's written receipt of property seller made a writ-
ten demand of debtor that property be returned; and
(3) at the time of debtor's receipt of the property seller had no actual
knowledge of the contemplation of the filing of a petition under this Act by or
against the debtor.
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such, it should permit reclamation to continue to be a fruitful
ground for litigation and controversy.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
It is salutary that many of the problems inherent in section
2-702 reclamations were addressed by the Code. Unfortunately,
many questions, which may involve protracted and expensive litiga-
tion and impair the efficient administration of bankrupts' estates, re-
main. This fact is inconsistent with one of the fundamental aims of
the reform legislation-to create an efficient and fair mechanism to
deal with bankrupts' estates. Some of the more salient unresolved
issues are discussed below.
Reclaiming sellers may be faced with problems of identifying the
goods in the hands of the debtor. The U.C.C. right of reclamation is
essentially a right to obtain the physical return of particular goods
in the hands of the debtor or trustee and identifiable as such. 0
Accordingly, reclamation may be denied when the goods were used
and, because of their use, are no longer identifiable or are unidentifi-
able because of their inherent nature, such as in the case of fungible
goods like scrap metal, stone, cement, or cattle. The burden of proof
is on the reclaiming seller to establish his title and the identity of
the goods. 1 This burden can be extremely difficult, especially in
view of the automatic stay provisions of section 362 of the Code,
which prohibit the seller from proceeding on an expedited basis to
secure the goods by action outside of the bankruptcy court. More-
over, the debtor or trustee may raise the issue of insolvency; in this
event the burden will be shifted to the seller to prove insolvency-a
difficult and expensive task, especially in any sizeable reorgan-
ization case. The existence of a blanket lien on all inventory can
work to defeat the reclaiming seller, notwithstanding that the secur-
ity holder may be fully secured and protected. A lender holding a
security interest in the debtor's after-acquired property is consi-
dered to be a good faith purchaser, and the existence of such an
interest may defeat the seller's reclamation with respect to the
encumbered property. It has been asserted that such a secured cred-
itor cuts off the rights of a reclaiming seller.2 Arguably, if at the
time of the seller's demand the goods are subject to a security inter-
est, the right of reclamation is never "triggered" and may not be
asserted subsequently."
50. Rights in property sought to be reclaimed should be determined as of the date
of the demand for reclamation. See In re Daylin, Inc., 596 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1979).
51. But see R. DUSENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, at § 13.03[4][c],[v].
52. In re Bowmhn, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 738 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
53. In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
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If the reclamation is valid but avoided by the trustee and a lien
is granted in lieu of a return of the goods, one may question
whether or not the seller becomes a secured creditor under section
506 of the Code, entitled to interest on his claim. If an administra-
tive claim is granted in lieu of a return of the goods, then it will be
argued that the claim should not receive interest and should be paid
at the conclusion of the case with other unsecured claims." To the
extent that a profit margin is built into the sales price of the goods,
interest may not be apppropriate. However, goods, materials, and
supplies necessary for the preservation of the estate will be ordered
and paid for by the debtor or trustee in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. This fact seems inconsistent with requiring the reclaiming
seller to wait for payment of his administrative claim.
Additionally, it is unknown what superior state-granted inter-
ests may be uncovered to defeat the reclaiming seller. This possi-
bility brings into focus the extent to which the bankruptcy courts
must adhere to state law under the, Erie doctrine or whether the
courts can view section 546(c) as a federal right and be free to inter-
pret the provision to conform to the dictates of federal bankruptcy
law and practice.55 If the courts must rely on local interpretation of
section 2-702 of the U.C.C., unresolved questions such as the timeli-
ness of the reclamation demand, the sufficiency of and proof of the de-
mand, the identification of the goods, tracing of the proceeds of the
goods, the date of buyer's receipt of the goods, and the right to stop
in-transit as being inconsistent with reclamation, will continue to
bring about confusion and inconsistent results."
Examination of these unresolved issues focuses attention on
fundamental policy considerations and the balancing of conflicting
rights of the seller versus the trustee, other secured parties, and
purchasers for value. The early defenders of the Bankruptcy Code
against reclaiming sellers obviously were fearful that to grant
reclamation would open the doors to state-created priorities and
defeat one of the essential purposes of the federal bankruptcy
legislation, the determination of priorities. This worry should no
longer be of major concern to those interpreting the new Code, as
(1976). See Sorrels v. Texas Bank & Trust Co. of Jacksonville, 597 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.
1979).
54. If the trustee loses in contesting a reclamation petition, the cost of the pro-
ceeding will be imposed on the estate as an expense of administration, in which event
interim legal fees, being expenses of administration, generally are awarded and paid to
the counsel engaged by the trustee. The trustee's fees similarly are paid.
55. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953).
56. See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 4, at 1171.
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many of the open issues concerning statutory liens have been
clarified by the reform legislation. Rather, the right of reclamation
should be viewed in light of the possible benefits of granting this
right toward some better measure of consistency and uniformity.
PROPOSALS
The day-to-day realities of business transactions are that a
debtor faced with serious financial circumstances is concentrating
maximum effort on maintaining operations to generate sales and
cash, while seeking additional financing or extensions of existing
financing. As such, he must have raw materials and other supplies
delivered on credit, notwithstanding that he knows he cannot pay
for them. Creditors, generally unaware of these circumstances, con-
tinue to supply these essential materials, with the expectation of
payment. It seems appropriate to recognize that these situations fre-
quently occur and to reevaluate traditional notions of fraud. The
consideration that the debtor may need to continue dealing, with his
suppliers subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy petition should be
an important factor in determining how to treat reclamation. The
moral principles involved tend to become confused with so many
divergent interests at stake. Creditors who feel defrauded are
unlikely to deal at arms length after a petition has been filed.
Buyers may be caught up by ethical issues involving conflicting
duties to suppliers and to the buyer entity, its employees, and share-
holders. The preparation and filing of a bankruptcy petition is usually
a measured action, often requiring lengthy analysis and formal
action by a board of directors.
To the extent that merchandise is obtained under these circum-
stances, creditors may urge that merchandise was obtained by fraudu-
lent means and, therefore, that the underlying indebtedness may not
be discharged in bankruptcy.57 In the final analysis, the debtor's
business may suffer rather than gain from the protection of the
bankruptcy proceedings if wronged sellers are not treated expedi-
tiously and fairly. It is submitted that lenders and other secured
creditors are in a better position to protect their interests and
usually do not count on goods that are the subject of reclamation in
their basic security packages. Bona fide and good faith purchasers of
57. The Bankruptcy Code denies a discharge as to all debts if the debtor has
engaged in certain prohibited conduct. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a) (1978). Corporations and
partnerships are eligible for discharge in Chapter 11 reorganization cases under sec-
tion 1141(d), which provides that the confirmation of a plan operates as a discharge.
The applicable provision of section 727 prohibits a discharge when "the debtor know-
ingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case ... received ... property...." 11
U.S.C.A. § 727 (a)(4)(C) (1978).
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the goods from the bankrupt present a different set of issues; there
are strong arguments to favor them over the reclaiming seller.
Sellers may seek protection under the U.C.C. by taking a purchase
money security interest in the goods. This safeguard, however, appears
to be somewhat unrealistic to expect in the context of everyday
transactions.
In the interests of balancing the equities and avoiding costly litiga-
tion, which unnecessarily saps the energies and resources of all con-
cerned parties, a better result would be to grant administrative
claims to creditors seeking reclamation under section 546(c) of the
Code without regard to the need to prove "insolvency" under the
strict bankruptcy definition of the Code. In this connection, it is sug-
gested that the courts move to create a presumption of insolvency
during some period, say thirty to ninety days prior to the institution
of bankruptcy, and thereby shift the burden to the debtor to
establish solvency, assuming that the debtor wishes to contest the
reclamation. Likewise, the Uniform Commercial Code requirements
to identify the goods or trace the proceeds should be disregarded,
unless meaningful prejudice can be shown to other parties having
superior interests in the reclaimed goods, such as good faith pur-
chasers or secured parties who are not otherwise adequately pro-
tected in the case. If a reclamation demand is properly made, yet
the goods are subsequently used or sold, the seller should be entitl-
ed to be paid promptly pursuant to an administrative expense claim.
Moreover, the presence of a fully-secured lender holding a blanket
lien or security interest in all of the debtor's property should not
work to defeat the reclaiming seller. Although the language of sec-
tion 546(c) seems to dictate a resort to state law, particularly the
Uniform Commercial Code, local requirements, such as the timeli-
ness of the demand and the sufficiency and proof of the demand,
should be construed in the context of the Code so as to grant more
uniformly reclamation when the seller is not otherwise precluded by
the trustee's avoiding powers or other provisions of the Code. The
Erie doctrine notwithstanding, to do otherwise will tend to resur-
rect the pre-Code confusion surrounding reclamation. The unresolv-
ed issues surrounding U.C.C. section 2-702 and previously mentioned
should not be litigated in the bankruptcy courts.
The magnitude of reclamation proceedings in major bankruptcy
cases frequently has given rise to the creation of special priority
classes of creditors who shipped or delivered goods within a defined
period before or after the filing of the petition. In the Chapter 11
reorganization proceedings involving City Store Company, B.
Lowenstein & Bros., Incorporated and W. & T. Sloan, Inc., the
general creditors, who in good faith delivered goods which were
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received by the debtor within a fourteen-day period preceding the
bankruptcy, were to receive according to the Debtors' Consolidated
Plan of Arrangement an additional 10% of their claims, to be paid in
cash upon the consummation of the plan.68 Likewise, in the J. M.
Fields, Inc., Food Fair, Inc. proceedings, the plan provided for
special treatment of claims resulting from sales and deliveries of
merchandise received during a five-day period preceding the bank-
ruptcy proceedings." These special arrangements worked to dispell
any notions that the merchandise was obtained under fraudulent
conditions. In the case of. Hartfield-Zodys, Inc.," all reclaiming
sellers properly making a demand under the U.C.C. were assured of
an administrative claim and much unnecessary litigation thereby
was avoided.
It has been suggested that reclamation demands be uniformly
granted as administrative claims to all sellers who have delivered
goods to the debtor within the ten-day period following the filing of
the bankruptcy petition."e This kind of provision and similar ar-
rangements have been made in a number of cases and have worked
well. The simplicity of this approach has a great deal of merit and
avoids the difficult and complex resolution of the competing interests
in the goods sought to be reclaimed and the issues involving in-
solvency.
Under this approach, the seller who ships goods shortly before
the petition and has, for example, his goods delivered after the ten-
day period has run will lose. This example suggests the need for the
retention of common law remedies involving principles of fraud or
the concept of insolvency embodied in the U.C.C. Most sellers, how-
ever, should be encompassed in such a ten-day period. This approach
to the problem, therefore, deserves attention by bankruptcy counsel
and the courts and can be made part of bankruptcy, especially reor-
ganization proceedings. It is incumbent on the bankrupt's counsel to
grasp quickly the magnitude of reclamation proceedings in the case
and to implement such an approach whenever appropriate.
This approach may in time lead to a revision of the Code to embody
its underlying concept, but the adoption of such an amendment does
not seem too realistic in view of the other competing interests and
the difficulties of resolving them in favor of the seller. Such a revi-
58. Nos. 79B 1320-79B 1323 (S.D.N.Y.).
59... Nos. 78B 1764-78B 1773 (S.D.N.Y.).
60. Nos. 74B 1633-74B 1634 (S.D.N.Y.).
61. See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 4, at 1176. Messrs. Weintraub and
Edelman unsuccessfully proposed this solution to the drafters of section 546(c) of the
Code.
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sion, however, would encourage the creation of an independent, fed-
eral reclamation right for employment in bankruptcy cases.2 In the
meantime, bankruptcy rules cannot be a solution. Section 247 of the
Code deletes the prior caveat that bankruptcy rules promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court take precedence over conflicting
provisions in the statute.
Section 546(c) of the Code provides the framework for the courts
to improve the handling of bankrupt estates, especially in large
reorganization cases involving retail establishments where reclama-
tion often becomes an important factor. It is hoped that the courts
will not become bogged down in technical interpretations of section
546(c) which can be argued to deny reclamation in its present frame-
work under the Code, but will maintain sight of the underlying
theme that reclamation be recognized consistently.
62. It is hoped that a federal right of reclamation would remove any questions
about whether section 546(c) in its present form revives common law reclamation,
which was resorted to in JayLaw Drug, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in
spite of the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-702(3), which supplant all common law remedies.
1176 [Vol. 41
